

LOST AND FOUND.

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"THE GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN."

The extended and soldierly review of the campaign and battle of Gettysburg, reported in the Philadelphia Times of last Thursday, and for the first time in the history of the war as "the most important contribution to the unwritten history of the war yet furnished."

It is well known that since the death of General Lee, a persistent attack has been made upon General Longstreet's action in that battle, and it has been frequently charged that his delay on the night of the 31st caused the loss of the battle. General Longstreet explains that he has preserved an almost unbroken silence since the battle, because he was loath to say a word, even though his own reputation suffered, that could be distorted into an attack upon General Lee. He publishes a printed letter written to his uncle, Judge Longstreet, just after the battle, in which he states that although his plans of the battle were disregarded, and the disaster followed for this reason, he preferred to shoulder the blame rather than, by a critical exposition of the facts, weaken the confidence that the army had in General Lee. The attack upon him has been so persistent and malevolent, he says, and comes direct from those who have some apparent authority from General Lee, that he feels bound to give the facts in the case with such comment as is necessary.

He then goes on to show that he acted up to General Lee's orders. The object was to drive Grant from West-Fredburg, and Longstreet's plan was to concentrate a heavy army in front of Lee's army, then near Eufaula, crossed him out and then moved toward Frederickburg, Kentucky. He asserts that his movement was approved by General Lee. "We would force Grant to leave Vicksburg," the Pennsylvania invasion was agreed upon, however, and the troops moved. General Longstreet gives a thorough interesting history of the movement of the troops, and shows how the change of course of the campaign was wholly due to the action of General Lee. General Lee's cavalry, in the deplorable absence of Stuart's cavalry, had been sent out to reconnoitre for the enemy. He shows also upon how slight an accident the battle of Gettysburg was brought on.

Concerning the battle itself, General Longstreet is very positive and particular. He first disproves by voluminous and indisputable evidence, his statement that he was ordered by General Lee to attack the enemy on the 31st of the 23. He shows that long after sunrise on the 24, Gen. Lee was still undetermined as to whether the attack should be opened upon our right or left—by Longstreet or by Ewell. He asserts that Gen. Lee never designated any hour, and that the order for attack was issued, and that the order for attack was not issued until the morning was well advanced. He then shows that the delay of forty minutes was made with Gen. Lee's acquiescence, waiting for Laws' brigade to reach the field of action. He then started to get him out of the line, and he says that the order was to march under the guidance of Col. Johnston of Gen. Lee's engineer corps, the object being to so conduct them that their march would be unobserved. The march was made by a circuitous route, and was often delayed, the engineer officers spending much time in finding a correct route. General Lee, after waiting until his patience gave out, he hurried forward, and found McLaws, who commanded the advance corps, waiting under orders from Gen. Lee, until Col. Johnston could find a covered route. Gen. Longstreet was, of course, in the rear, and he says that he was, in direct opposition to Gen. Lee's orders, but he rode back, and ordered Gen. Wood to bring his division forward as rapidly as possible, and without any regard to any concealment. He thus really precipitated the battle instead of delaying it. He further states that Gen. Lee, after the battle, called him directly in his company, or within a few minutes march of him, and had there been a delay of several hours, as is alleged, or had what delay there was been inexplicable or annoying to Gen. Lee, that he would have at once sent orders to Gen. Longstreet to bring the troops forward.

Gen. Longstreet discusses the battle of the 31st, and shows that the generally acknowledged to have been unwise, and shows that he stoutly and earnestly protested against making it. He says that General Lee afterwards asked him why "he did not stop all that business that day." Gen. Longstreet replied that after he had seen the general's order, he did not feel justified in doing it. He says that the account of the battle is thrilling and graphic.

The distinguished soldier says that the failure of the campaign was due to the absence of Stuart's cavalry, for which Stuart was hardly to blame—the ill-advised attack on the 2nd, and the ill-advised attack on the 31st. He says that the true policy being to have flanked Meade's army, and taken position between it and Washington. The popular clamor through the north would have forced Meade to attack Lee in a fortified position, and he could not have done so. He says that he agreed in a council at Frederickburg before the troops marched, that the campaign should be one of offensive strategy, but defensive tactics—in other words, that while the invasion should be made, the confederates should be on the watch to prevent the enemy into attacking them. This policy was abandoned only on the evening of the first day's fight. That encounter between our advance and Reynolds' corps was wholly accidental, and the success gained by our arms was due to the fact that he ordered him into ordering an attack the next day that in the light of subsequent events is shown to have been hopeless, and could have been regarded in but little better light at the time. Gen. Lee is quoted upon this point in which he says that his whole plan was based upon great confidence in the ability of his men and the superiority of his officers. Gen. Longstreet also quotes a letter from Gen. Lee written after the battle in which he says: "Had I followed your advice how different all would have been. Additional evidence is given that the plan was not a mistake. He realized that he had made a mistake."

Gen. Longstreet fully and triumphantly vindicates his reputation as a soldier, it seems to us, in his admirable review. He covers every point of attack, and offers many new and convincing suggestions. In the course of this article, he pays a tribute to the soldier who, under McLaws' Hood, made the fight on the "most of the"

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